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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

t

JANERO D. ROMERO,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890119-CA

Category No. 2

t

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from his conviction of Possession of
a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in the Second
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly found that the

confidential informant's %report discovered after trial was not
sufficient to establish grounds for a new trial?
2.

Whether defendant failed to raise the issue of

perjured testimony below and should be precluded from raising it
for the first time on appeal?
3.

Whether the prosecutor's closing remarks regarding

the lesser offense of possession were fairly based on the
evidence and not misleading to the jury?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant provisions are set forth in the text of
the brief and need not be restated here.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Janero D. Romero, was charged with
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8
(Supp. 1988), and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (Supp.
1988) (R. 1-2). Defendant was convicted of Possession of a
Controlled Substance by a jury on October 6, 1988, in the Second
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah,
the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge, presiding (R. 47). Judge
Roth sentenced defendant to a prison term not to exceed five
years.

Id.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 31, 1988, police informant Shauna Mains

arranged to purchase cocaine from defendant through Terry Schmidt
(T. 89). Shauna subsequently called Detective Gard of the Roy
City Police Department and informed him of the proposed buy (T.
103).

Detective Gard met Shauna at a nearby 7-11 store parking

lot, gave her $225.00 in cash which he had xeroxed, and put a
wireless listening device in her purse (T. 91, 103-104, 106).
Detective Gard followed Shauna back to her house with other
members of the narcotics task force (T. 106). Approximately five
minutes later, Schmidt arrived in a van with Lou Burns (T. 91-92,
106).

Shauna gave Schmidt the money and told him she wanted to

go with him to make the buy (T. 92). Schmidt took her to the
defendant's house, but told her she had to wait in the van with
Burns (T. 93-94, 100-102, 107). After approximately 20 minutes,
Schmidt returned with the cocaine (T. 94-95, 107). Detective
Gard and the others from the task force followed the van back to
Shauna's house (T. 108). After Schmidt and Burns left, Shauna
turned over the cocaine to Detective Gard (T. 98, 108).
Detective Gard then returned to defendant's house, and
between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m., observed between six and eight
vehicles arrive and stay for short periods of time (T. 109, 119120).

At least two times, Detective Gard 6aw defendant come out

of the house and walk up to the cars that had arrived (T. 109).
This information was used to obtain a search warrant of
defendant's house the following day (T. 111). Shauna's
handwritten report was subsequently placed in the police file
assigned to the Schmidt cocaine buy (R. 76-77).
The police executed a search warrant on defendant's
house about noon on September 1, 1988 (T. 123). Present at the
time of the search was defendant, his daughter, and her friend
Tracy (T. 115). Defendant was taken into custody and read his
miranda rights (T. 115, 132). Defendant told Sergeant Wells that
he owned the house and that he lived there with the two girls (T.
87).
A search of defendant's home produced nine baggies of
cocaine found under a flowerpot on the back porch and
approximately $1750.00 in cash found in a plastic bag in
defendant's bedroom between his mattress and waterbed frame (T.

66-68/ 112-113f 181/ 295). The serial number on one of the
$20.00 bills matched Detective Gard's xeroxed copy of the
controlled buy money Shauna had used the day before to purchase
the cocaine (T. 114). When questioned about the $20.00 bill/
defendant stated that he had no idea how it got there (T. 116).
Defendant volunteered to police that a barrel in the
basement contained a white substance found by him at the dump (T.
129-130/ 236/ 286). Defendant claimed he did not know what the
white substance consisted of (T. 236-237/ 275). Police searched
the basement and found a 21 pound bucket containing a white
substance later analyzed and identified as approximately
$1700.00-1800.00 of inositol/ a cocaine-cutting agent (T. 148,
163).

Police also found a magazine in defendant's room with

squares cut out of it (T. 116). Detective Gard testified that
this type of paper is used to hold cocaine because it is almost
water resistant (T. 117).
Tracy, who had lived with defendant for nearly two
years and treated him as her father, told police that the cocaine
c
was hers and that she was selling it because her mom did not give
her any money (T. 177, 212). Defendant told her to be quiet/
that she did not have to say that/ and that everything would be
all right (T. 285). At trial/ Tracy admitted that she did
receive money from her mother and others and that she had lied to
the police because she did not want defendant to go to jail (T.
188-195/ 212/ 219 ). She further claimed at trial that she was
holding the cocaine for one of her boyfriends who was in trouble
with the police (T. 182# 185). She said that she had not seen

the boyfriend since defendant was arrested and believed he went
back to California (T. 182, 197).
At trial, defendant corroborated Shauna and Detective
Gard's testimony by admitting that Schmidt had been at his house
the day before the arrest at about 5:00 p.m. and that he stayed
approximately 20 minutes (T. 267-271).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for
new trial based on defendant's claim of newly discovered
exculpatory evidence.

The confidential informant stated in a

report provided to police that she saw her contact Schmidt enter
a red house with yellow trim.

Because this report had been

placed in another case file and forgotten, it was not provided to
defendant through discovery prior to trial.

Defendant claims

that the informant's statement was exculpatory and warrants a new
trial because his house has brown trim.

However, the statement

merely goes to the credibility of the witness and the weight to
be afforded her testimony.

Generally, impeachment evidence is

considered insufficient to warrant a new trial.

In any event,

the newly discovered statement is insubstantial and unlikely to
produce a different result in light of the totality of the
evidence.

The informant identified a photo of defendant's house

at trial and her testimony was corroborated by other evidence
presented at trial.
Defendant failed to raise the prosecutor's alleged
knowing use of perjured testimony in the trial court below and
may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal.

In any

event, the standard for reviewing a conviction obtained by the
knowing use of perjured testimony is whether there is any
reasonable likelihood that the perjury could have affected the
jury's verdict.

In the present case, the alleged perjury is

nothing more than a "minor discrepancy" regarding the
confidential informant's perception of the color of trim on
defendant's house.

The color of trim was not material to

defendant's guilt or innocence nor is there any evidence in the
record to establish that the confidential informant actually
testified as to the color of the trim on defendant's house.
Defendant claims that the prosectitor improperly
commented on the legal standard for the lesser offense of
possession.

In fact, the prosecutor merely pointed out that if

the jury believed defendant's story that he was not selling
drugs, the jury could still consider whether defendant was guilty
of illegal possession of drugs.

The jury was clearly instructed

on the non-evidentiary status of closing arguments and the
necessary elements of Possession of a Controlled Substance.
Further, the term "possession" was defined for the jury.

In

light of the fairly based comment by the prosecutor and the clear
jury instructions, the jury could not have been confused or
misled by the prosecutor's comment at closing argument.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE.
After trial, a handwritten report created by the
confidential informant, Shauna Maines, was discovered at a
forfeiture hearing in a police file with a case number assigned
to the Schmidt case.

Because the report had been placed in

another case file and forgotten, it was not provided to defendant
through discovery prior to trial.

Defendant now claims that

because his house has brown trim, the house with "yellow trim"
described by Shauna in the report does not fit the description of
his house (Br. of App. at 3). He claims that the trial court
erred in denying his Motion for New Trial based on the newly
discovered exculpatory evidence.

Defendant's claim should be

rejected.
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that "the
decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion
with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear
abuse of that discretion.
(Utah 1985).

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222

The Court has further explained that it is a

"matter solely within the discretion of the trial court as to
whether it should grant a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence."

State v, Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77, 513 P.2d

438, 439 (Utah 1973).

A trial court's decision "will be deemed

an abuse of discretion only in such instances where there is a
grave suspicion that justice may have been miscarried because of

the lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the new
evidence will supply" Id. at 439-440.

In other words, M[i]f

there be evidence before the court upon which reasonable men
might differ as to whether or not the defendant is guilty, the
trial court may deny a motion for a new trial."

Ld. at 440.

Three criteria must be met in a motion for a new trial
on the basis of newly discovered evidence.

These are:

(1) that

the evidence is material and newly discovered, (2) that using due
diligence it could not have been discovered prior to trial, and
(3) that the evidence is substantial enough that, with it, there
might have been a different result.

Gregerson v. Jensen, 617

P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980).
In the present case, the newly discovered evidence
consisted of a prior inconsistent statement of the confidential
informant.

Such evidence merely goes to the credibility of the

witness and the weight to be afforded her testimony.

Impeachment

evidence is generally considered insufficient to warrant a new
trial.

Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); United States v.

Myers, 534 F.Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).

In Myers, the court held

that:
Newly discovered evidence that merely goes to
impeach the credibility of a prosecution
witness is ordinarily not sufficient to
justify a,new trial, . . . particularly when
the newly discovered evidence would be "only
an additional part of a cumulative attack on
the witness' credibility."
Meyers, 534 F.Supp. at 756 (citations omitted) quoting, United
States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456
U.S. 946 (1982).
1, 9 (1956).

See also, Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S.

In the instant case, the newly discovered evidence is
insubstantial and unlikely to produce a different result when
compared to the totality of the evidence.

Detective Gard

corroborated Shauna's testimony that Schmidt entered defendant's
house to purchase cocaine (T. 107). At trial, Shauna identified
defendant's house in a photograph as the house Schmidt entered to
make the cocaine buy (R. 77) (Br. of App. at 2).

Even defendant

himself testified that Terry Schmidt entered his house that day
(T. 267-271).

In light of the overwhelming and uncontested

evidence that defendant's house was the location of the
controlled purchase, the confidential informant's inconsistent
statement regarding the color of trim on defendant's house is not
sufficient grounds to justify a new trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has also clarified the standard
in determining whether exculpatory evidence was not disclosed by
the prosecution:
[a] fair-minded prosecutor is not likely to
be aware of all potential evidence which
defendant may think relevant, and we do not
think it reasonable, given the adversary
nature of the criminal process, to require a
prosecutor to disclose all evidence which
might possibly be useful to the defense but
which is not likely to have a foreseeable
effect upon the verdict. Such a requirement
would create unbearable burdens and also
uncertainties with respect to the finality of
judgments."
State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980).

Similarly, the

United States Supreme Court has held that Ma prosecutor has a
constitutional duty to volunteer obviously exculpatory evidence
and evidence that is 'BO clearly supportive of a claim of
innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to

produce.'M

United States v. Agursf 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)

(emphasis added), quoted in State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224
(Utah 1980).

However, a new trial is not justified if there is

no reasonable doubt about guilt even considering the additional
evidence.

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113-114.
In the present case, the additional evidence merely

raised doubts about the color of trim on defendant's house.

It

does not, however, raise any significant doubts about the strong
evidence supporting the jury's finding of guilt. In light of the
overwhelming evidence supporting the conviction and the
insubstantiality of the alleged exculpatory evidence, this Court
should find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying defendant's Motion for a New Trial.
POINT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE IN
THE TRIAL COURT, HE CANNOT NOW CLAIM ON
APPEAL THAT THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY USED
PERJURED TESTIMONY.
Defendant further claims that the prosecutor knowingly
used the perjured testimony of Shauna Mains (Br. of App. at 5).
His claim is again based on the apparent inconsistency regarding
the color of trim on defendant's house.

Defendant's claim is

wholly without merit and should be rejected.
It must be first pointed out that defendant raises the
issue of perjured testimony for the first time on direct appeal.
(R. 54-56; Supplement to Motion for New Trial.)

It is well-

established that an appellate court will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal.
252 (Utah 1982).

State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d

Accordingly, this Court should not consider

defendant's unpreserved claim.

In the event this Court reaches the merits of
defendant's claim, defendant's claim must fail.

The Utah Supreme

Court and the United States Supreme Court have clearly identified
the standard of review regarding a claim of a prosecutor's
knowing use of perjured testimony.

A conviction obtained by the

knowing use of perjured testimony will not be upheld if it is
shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that the perjury
could have affected the jury's verdict.

United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah
1984).

No actual knowledge of the perjury on the part of the

prosecutor is necessary so long as the prosecutor should have
known of the perjury, Aqurs, 427 U.S. at 103.

However, it must

be acknowledged that "[ejvery lawyer, indeed every intelligent
layman, recognizes that minor discrepancies may occur in
statements made by one person at different times."

State v.

Jarrell# 608 P.2d 218, 227 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).
In the present case, the alleged perjury is nothing
more than a Mminor discrepancy" regarding the confidential
informant's perception of the color of trim on defendant's house.
The color of trim on defendant's house was not material to the
determination of defendant's guilt or innocence, particularly
where it was undisputed that defendant's house was the location
of the alleged criminal acts.

Further, there is nothing in the

record to establish that the confidential informant actually
testified as to the color of the trim on defendant's house.
Thus, no perjury exists and no error occurred.

POINT III
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
WAS FAIRLY BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT
CONFUSING OR MISLEADING TO THE JURY.
Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor's
rebuttal comment during closing argument was improper because the
prosecutor incorrectly stated the law to the jury.

He argues

that as a result of the remark, defendant may have been convicted
without a finding of actual possession of a controlled substance.
In order for defendant to successfully argue error
based on prosecutorial misconduct, he must show some degree of
demonstrable prejudice.

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255

(Utah 1988), on reconsideration, 773 P.2d 631 (1989).

The Utah

Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test for determining whether
a prosecutor's remark warrants reversal; "(1) did the remarks
call to the attention of the jurors matters which they could not
properly consider in determining their verdict, and (2) were the
jurors under the circumstances of the particular case probably
influenced by those remarks."
(Utah 1986).

State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185, 187

Under Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedures, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded.-

This Court should not reverse a conviction unless

the error "is something substantial and prejudicial in the sense
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there
would have been a different result."
313, 316 (Utah 1980).

State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d

Further, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that
"'[cjounsel for both sides have considerable latitude in their
[closing] arguments to the jury; they have a right to discuss
fully from their stand points the evidence and the inferences and
deductions arising therefrom.'"

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at

1255, quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422,
426 (1973).

Additionally, a curative jury instruction is

generally sufficient to obviate any harm from an improper comment
by the prosecutor.

State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah

1982); State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983).
In the present case, defendant alleges that an improper
statement was made by the prosecutor during rebuttal argument.
The following statement occurred:
If this doesn't convict him, you have a
lesser included in there of simple
possession. Based upon the Defendant's
testimony, which he denies, I told Tracy to
get it out of the house last week. I don't
know, if you are going to give him credit for
that, then I suppose—and you can find him
guilty of simple possession, because he
wouldn't be possessing this stuff to sell.
And if you don^t think that this was based on
the facts of putting it all together that
this cocaine was being—was being held there
was part of the cocaine that's being sold,
was in fact sold, then I guess you will not
find element two or three of the main charge
we have, possession of cocaine with the
intent to distribute. If you have any
problem with the key words, why just read the
Instructions. The Judge gives you a whole
list of definitions just for your
edification. So possession of it. And part
two, he is possessing it to put into the
stream of commerce, so to speak.
(T. 65) (emphasis added).

Respondent submits that the comment

made by the prosecutor was within the wide latitude afforded

-11-

counsel to comment on the evidence.

The comment was not

misleading where the prosecutor simply pointed out that if the
jury believed defendant's story that he was not selling drugs,
they could still consider whether defendant was guilty of
possession.

Id.

He referred the jury to the instructions and

suggested they pay particular attention to the definitions
provided.

J^d.

The evidence strongly supported a theory of

possession where the cocaine was found on the porch of
defendant's house and the cash, including the $20.00 bill from
the police buy money, was found in defendant's bedroom between
defendant's waterbed mattress and bed frfiime (T. 74, 87, 112-114).
It should be further noted that the trial judge
submitted several instructions to the jury which would have a
curative effect on the claimed error.

Id.

The trial judge

instructed the jury that statements made by counsel during the
trial were not evidence and the jury was not to consider them as
such (R. 29; Jury Instruction No. 1). The jury was also
instructed on the elements of Possession of a Controlled
Substance With Intent to Distribute, or, if all of the elements
were not met, the lesser charged offense of Possession of a
Controlled Substance (R. 33-34; Jury Instruction No's. 5-6).
The term -possession" was defined for the jury to mean Mto have
possession of or to'exercise dominion or control over tangible
property.

It may mean either joint or individual ownership or

control."

(R. 38; Jury Instruction No. 9.)
As noted earlier, a curative jury instruction is

generally sufficient to obviate any harm from an improper comment

by a witness or counsel.
(Utah 1982).

State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this

Court -must assume that the jurors were conscientious in
performing to their duty, and that they followed the instructions
of the court.M

State v. Hodgesf 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322,

1324 (1974); State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah 1978).
In light of the fair subject matter of the comment, the
strong evidence of possession, and the clear instructions
presented to the jury, this Court should find that the
prosecutor's comment was not confusing or misleading to the jury.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, respondent requests this
.

Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
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